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I. INTRODUCTION
As discrimination law has evolved in this country, homosexuals
have joined the increasing number of identifiable groups seeking pro-
tection through antidiscrimination ordinances.1 The homosexual com-
munity's success in adding sexual orientation to many state and local
antidiscrimination laws 2 has provoked a heretofore unseen response:
© Copyright held by the NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW.
1. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1626 (1996)(identifying traits that
have been protected against discrimination: age, military status, marital status,
pregnancy, parenthood, custody of a minor child, political affiliation, physical or
mental disability of an individual or his or her associates, and sexual
orientation).
2. See, e.g., ASPEN, COLO., MUN. CODE § 13-98 (1977)(prohibiting discrimination in
employment, housing, and public accommodations on the basis of sexual orienta-
tion); BOULDER, COLO., REV. CODE §§ 12-1-2 to 12-1-4 (1987)(same); DENVER,
COLO., REV. MUN. CODE art. IV, §§ 28-91 to 28-116 (1991)(same). See also COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-3-1104 (West 1997)(forbidding health insurance providers
from determining insurability or premiums on the basis of an insured's sexual
orientation); Colo. Exec. Order No. D0035 (1990)(prohibiting employment dis-
crimination for all state employees on the basis of sexual orientation).
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laws such as amendments to state constitutions or city charters that
forbid inclusion of homosexuality in antidiscrimination laws.3
The latest enactment of these "trumping" laws was Colorado's
Amendment Two. 4 Amendment Two prohibited any level of Colorado
government from enacting or enforcing any law granting protected
status on the basis of homosexuality. Specifically, it provided:
No Protected Status Based on Homosexual, Lesbian, or Bisexual Orientation.
Neither the State of Colorado, through any of its branches or departments,
nor any of its agencies, political subdivisions, municipalities or school dis-
tricts, shall enact, adopt or enforce any statute, regulation, ordinance or policy
whereby homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or re-
lationships shall constitute or otherwise be the basis of or entitle any person
or class of persons to have or claim any minority status, quota preferences,
protected status or claim of discrimination. This Section of the Constitution
shall be in all respects self-executing.
5
Amendment Two was immediately challenged in the District Court
for the City and County of Denver as violative of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 6 and was subsequently struck
down by the Colorado Supreme Court.7 The State of Colorado ap-
pealed, and the United States Supreme Court affirmed the Colorado
3. Examples to date include the following:
Title X11, City Charter of Cincinnati, Ohio (1993), which voided existing ordi-
nances giving protected status to homosexuals and precluded any similar future
legislation. This amendment was upheld by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.
See Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati v. City of Cincinnati, 54 F.3d 261 (6th
Cir. 1995). The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and summarily
vacated the Sixth Circuit decision, remanding the case for reconsideration in
light of Romer. Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati,
116 S. Ct. 2519 (1996). On remand, the Sixth Circuit again upheld the validity of
Title XII in light of the Sixth Circuit's reading of Romer. Equality Found. of
Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, Nos. 94-3855, 94-3973, and 94-
4280, 1997 WL 656228 (6th Cir. Oct. 23, 1997).
Oregon Measure 9, which would have amended the Oregon Constitution to
prohibit recognition of sexual orientation or sexual preference as a civil rights
category, but was defeated by a vote of 56% to 44% in 1992. Oregon Measure 13,
a similar antigay rights initiative, was defeated by a vote of 53% to 47% in 1994.
See Daniel A. Butterman, Comment, Evans v. Romer: The Political Process,
Levels of Generality, and Perceived Identifiability in Anti-Gay Rights Initiatives,
29 NEw ENG. L. REV. 915, 916 n.9 (1995).
4. Amendment Two was enacted on Nov. 3, 1992, by a vote of 813,966 (53.4%) to
710,151 (46.6%). Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270, 1272 (Colo. 1993). These laws
are dubbed "trumping" laws because they override, or trump, the ability of polit-
ical subdivisions to choose whether to include groups under antidiscrimination
laws, rules, or ordinances.
5. CoLO. CoNsT. art. H, § 30b. Although the enforcement of Amendment Two has
been permanently enjoined, it remains a part of the Colorado Constitution.
6. The Equal Protection Clause states that "No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws." U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
7. Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335 (Colo. 1994).
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Supreme Court's decision, although under a different equal protection
analysis than that utilized by the Colorado Supreme Court.8
This Note analyzes the decision of the United States Supreme
Court in Romer v. Evans and predicts its practical impact. First, the
majority and dissenting opinions and the major arguments on both
sides are summarized. Second, these arguments are analyzed as ap-
plied to homosexual groups, as well as other groups that potentially
may be affected. Finally, this Note predicts the impact that Romer
will have on future attempts to "trump" state or local antidiscrimina-
tion laws, as applied to homosexuals or other identifiable groups.
II. ROMER V. EVANS
Each court that considered the constitutional challenge to Amend-
ment Two analyzed it under the Equal Protection Clause. Equal pro-
tection analysis differs depending on the type of legislation or state
action involved. Generally, courts use three different standards of re-
view when legislation is challenged under the Equal Protection
Clause. Strict scrutiny, the highest standard, is used only when legis-
lation classifies by a "suspect" class or infringes a fundamental right.9
To survive strict scrutiny, a law must be narrowly tailored to meet a
compelling state interest. Intermediate scrutiny, used when a law
classifies by a "quasi-suspect" class, requires a substantial relation to
an important state interest.o The lowest standard of review, often
referred to as the rational basis test, is used in all other circumstances
and requires only some rational relation to a legitimate state interest.
Determining the applicable level of review is critical, as decisions
often turn on the standard of review that is applied.
A. Facts and Background
Immediately following its enactment, Amendment Two was chal-
lenged in district court.l The plaintiffs to the suit included a group of
homosexual persons, municipalities that had enacted antidiscrimina-
tion ordinances, and other governmental entities affected by Amend-
ment Two. These plaintiffs filed suit in the District Court for the City
and County of Denver seeking a declaration of invalidity of Amend-
8. Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996).
9. The "suspect" classes identified to date include race, alienage, and national ori-
gin. Fundamental rights are those personal rights enumerated in the Constitu-
tion. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S.
365 (1971).
10. The "quasi-suspect" classes include gender and illegitimacy. See Craig v. Boren,
429 U.S. 190 (1976); Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976).
11. Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270, 1272 (Colo. 1993). Suit was filed on Nov. 12,
1992, 9 days after Amendment Two's enactment.
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GAY RIGHTS
ment Two and an injunction against its enforcement.' 2 The plaintiffs
contended that Amendment Two violated a number of constitutional
rights, primarily the rights to equal protection of the laws under the
Fourteenth Amendment and freedom of expression under the First
Amendment.' 3
The district court rejected the plaintiffs' request for an expedited
hearing on the merits, but instead granted a preliminary injunction.' 4
Under Colorado law, a trial court may issue an injunction if the mov-
ing party meets a six-part test and, as a threshold requirement,
clearly demonstrates that injunctive relief is necessary to protect an
existing fundamental constitutional right.i5 The district court held
that the plaintiffs met this threshold requirement because Amend-
ment Two violated a fundamental right, primarily not to have the
State endorse and foster private biases.' 6 Upon a further determina-
tion that the plaintiffs met all of the elements of the six-part test, the
court issued the preliminary injunction.' 7
The State of Colorado appealed the preliminary injunction to the
Colorado Supreme Court (Evans 1), alleging that the district court
erred in finding that the plaintiffs met the threshold requirement to
obtain an injunction.'8 Specifically, the State of Colorado complained
that the fundamental right relied upon by the district court was non-
existent.' 9 In response, the plaintiffs contended that Amendment
Two violated the fundamental right of gays and lesbians to participate
in the political process. 2 0
The Colorado Supreme Court struck down the amendment.2 ' In
reaching its conclusion, the court applied a series of United States
12. Id.
13. Id. Other constitutional rights initially alleged by plaintiffs to be violated by
Amendment Two included the right to petition government for redress of griev-
ances; the constitutional prohibition against the establishment of religion; uncon-
stitutional vagueness; violation of the Guarantee Clause of Article IV, § 4 of the
United States Constitution; and violation of the Supremacy Clause and Due Pro-
cess Clause of the United States Constitution. Id. at 1272-73 n.2.
14. Id. at 1273-74.
15. Rathke v. MacFarland, 648 P.2d 648 (Colo. 1982). To satisfy the 6-part test, the
moving party must demonstrate the following: (1) a reasonable probability of
success on the merits; (2) a danger of real, immediate, and irreparable injury that
may be prevented by injunctive relief; (3) no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy
at law; (4) if a preliminary injunction is granted, it will not disserve the public
interest; (5) the balance of equities favors the injunction; and (6) the injunction
will preserve the status quo pending a trial on the merits. Id. at 653-54.
16. Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270, 1273-74 (Colo. 1993).
17. Id. See supra note 15.
18. Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270 (Colo. 1993).
19. Id. at 1274.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 1286.
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Supreme Court decisions involving voting rights,2 2 discriminatory re-
apportionment of political power,2 3 and the rights of minority political
parties.2 4 It relied most heavily, however, on a series of cases involv-
ing attempts to limit the ability of certain groups to implement de-
sired legislation through normal political processes.2 5
Two such cases in particular are applicable to an analysis of
Amendment Two. First, in Hunter v. Erickson,2 6 the United States
Supreme Court invalidated an Akron, Ohio charter amendment that
required fair housing ordinances to be approved by a citywide referen-
dum. All other city ordinances could be approved by a vote of the city
council. The Supreme Court held that the amendment violated the
equal protection rights of racial minorities by placing special burdens
on them before they could participate in the governmental process. 2 7
Second, in Washington v. Seattle School District No. 1,28 the consti-
tutionality of a Washington initiative prohibiting school districts from
using mandatory busing as a means to affect school desegregation was
questioned. Relying on Hunter, the Washington Court held that the
initiative impermissably interfered with the political process and un-
lawfully burdened the efforts of minority groups to secure public
benefits.29
One common thread running through Hunter and Washington is
that both of the invalidated laws impermissibly affected the rights of
racial minorities. Citing James v. Valtierra,3 0 the State of Colorado
argued that Amendment Two should be upheld because the Hunter
holding was limited to racial issues.3 1 In James, the Supreme Court
upheld a California constitutional amendment requiring a community
vote for approval of any new low-rent housing project. The Court de-
clined to find that poor individuals' fundamental rights to participate
22. Id. at 1277. The voting rights cases included Kramer v. Union Free School Dis-
trict No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969); Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S.
663 (1966); and Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965).
23. Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270, 1276-77 (Colo. 1993). The reapportionment cases
included Lucas v. Forty-Fourth General Assembly of Colorado, 377 U.S. 713
(1964); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); and Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S.
1 (1964).
24. Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270, 1278-79 (Colo. 1993). The "minority party rights"
cases included Illinois State Board of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440
U.S. 173 (1979); and Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
25. Evans v. Roner, 854 P.2d 1270, 1279-82 (Colo. 1993). This line of cases included
Washington v. Seattle School District No. 1,458 U.S. 457 (1982); Gordon v. Lance,
403 U.S. 1 (1971); James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971); and Hunter v. Erick-
son, 393 U.S. 385 (1969).
26. 393 U.S. 385 (1969).
27. Id. at 391.
28. 458 U.S. 457 (1982).
29. Id. at 467-70.
30. 402 U.S. 137 (1971).
31. Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270, 1282 (Colo. 1993).
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in the political process had been violated, stating that the initiative
was not aimed at racial minorities. 32
The Colorado Supreme Court rejected this argument, finding
James to be "best understood as a case declining to apply suspect class
status to the poor, and not as a limitation on Hunter."33 Holding that
Amendment Two violated a fundamental right of political participa-
tion under Hunter (and thus warranting strict scrutiny), the case was
remanded to the district court to determine if Amendment Two was
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.34
On remand, the district court considered six compelling state inter-
ests presented by Colorado as justifications to uphold Amendment
Two.35 Ultimately, the court held that Amendment Two was not nar-
rowly tailored to any compelling state interest offered and perma-
nently enjoined its enforcement.3 6
On appeal (Evans I), the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the
district court's application of strict scrutiny, noting that Colorado
failed to offer any arguments for a lesser standard of scrutiny that the
Colorado Supreme Court had not previously rejected in Evans L37
The court also affirmed the district court's holding that Amendment
Two failed to satisfy strict scrutiny,38 finding that the unconstitu-
tional portions of the amendment were not severable from the remain-
der.3 9 The court further rejected the State's argument that
Amendment Two was a valid exercise of state power under the Tenth
Amendment.4 0
The United States Supreme Court subsequently granted
certiorari.4 1
32. James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 141 (1971).
33. Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270, 1282 n.21 (Colo. 1993).
34. Id. at 1286.
35. The State of Colorado offered as compelling state interests: (1) deterring faction-
alism; (2) preserving the integrity of the state's political functions; (3) preserving
the ability of the state to remedy discrimination against suspect classes; (4)
preventing the government from interfering with personal, familial, and religious
privacy, (5) preventing the government from subsidizing the political objectives of
a special interest group; and (6) promoting the physical and psychological well-
being of Colorado children. Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335, 1339-40 (Colo. 1994).
36. Id. at 1339-41.
37. Id- at 1341.
38. Id. at 1341-49.
39. Id. at 1349-50.
40. Id. at 1350.
41. Romer v. Evans, 513 U.S. 1146 (1995)(mem.). Because Amendment Two
amended the Colorado Constitution, the Colorado Supreme Court had to base its
analysis on federal grounds. This guaranteed that the United States Supreme
Court would ultimately have jurisdiction. In contrast, a statute passed by the
Colorado Legislature could have been invalidated under the Colorado Constitu-
tion. Had that occurred, the decision could not have been appealed to the United
States Supreme Court, so long as the Colorado Supreme Court's decision rested
19971
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B. The Opinions
1. Majority Opinion
The majority opinion in Romer v. Evans, written by Justice Ken-
nedy and joined by five other Justices,42 held Amendment Two viola-
tive of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Court declined, however, to follow the Colorado Supreme Court's
application of strict scrutiny. Applying instead the rational relation
test, the Court struck down the amendment on two grounds. First,
the majority reasoned that the imposition of a broad and undifferenti-
ated disability on a single named group was a form of legislation
outside of the American constitutional tradition.4 3 Second, the
breadth of the amendment led the Court to believe that the amend-
ment was motivated by animus for homosexuals, rather than by any
legitimate state concern. 44
At the outset of their discussion, the majority examined Colorado's
argument that Amendment Two merely prevented granting special
rights to homosexuals.45 Focusing on the protections withheld by
Amendment Two, the Court rejected this contention, reasoning that
"[t]hese are protections taken for granted by most people either be-
cause they already have them or do not need them."4 6 This determi-
nation cleared the way for the remainder of the Court's decision,
where the majority articulated its reasons for invalidating Amend-
ment Two. Rejecting the "special rights" characterization was essen-
tial to invalidating Amendment Two since a state is not
constitutionally required to grant any such rights.
The first basis for invalidating Amendment Two was the majority's
notion that the amendment was outside of the American constitu-
tional tradition.47 In other words, the majority objected to the form of
the legislation, rather than to the classification it used. As the Court
stated, Amendment Two imposed "a broad and undifferentiated disa-
bility on a single named group, an exceptional and... invalid form of
legislation."48 In essence, the Court disagreed with the State of Colo-
rado's edict that one group of its citizens could not protect themselves
from discrimination, while leaving that door open to all other groups.
on adequate and independent state grounds. See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 3-24 (2d ed. 1988); JoHN E. NowAK Er AL., CON-
STITUTIONAL LAw § 2.13 (3d ed. 1986).
42. Justice Kennedy was joined by Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Souter, Ginsburg,
and Breyer. Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1623 (1996).
43. Id. at 1627-28.
44. Id. at 1628-29.
45. Id. at 1624-27.
46. Id. at 1627.
47. Id. at 1627-28.
48. Id. at 1627 (emphasis added).
[Vol. 76:352
GAY RIGHTS
The Court also held that Amendment Two failed to bear a rational
relationship to a legitimate state interest.49 Colorado asserted that
the purpose of the law was twofold. The first included respect for the
freedom of association of its citizenry, particularly landlords and em-
ployers with a personal or religious objection to homosexuality. The
second asserted purpose was to conserve resources that could be used
to combat other forms of discrimination.50 The breadth of the amend-
ment, however, led the Court to conclude that the overriding motive
behind Amendment Two was animosity for homosexuals. 51 Stating
that "'a bare... desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot
constitute a legitimate governmental interest,'" the Court concluded
that the amendment did not survive rational basis scrutiny.5 2
2. Dissenting Opinion
Any issue worthy of the title "controversial" has at least two sides,
and the debate over the constitutional validity of Amendment Two is
no exception. In the dissenting opinion of Romer v. Evans, Justice
Scalia vigorously argued that Colorado was well within its bounds
when enacting Amendment Two.53
The dissent defended Colorado's "special rights" argument,54 rea-
soning that "[t]he amendment prohibits special treatment of homosex-
uals, and nothing more."5 5 Justice Scalia offered several examples to
demonstrate that Amendment Two would only prevent homosexuals
from obtaining preferential treatment vis-A.-vis the general (heterosex-
ual) population.Se This characterization of Amendment Two was em-
phasized throughout the dissent and was utilized in later arguments
advanced by the dissent.
Accepting that discrimination protection for homosexuals gives
homosexuals special rights, the dissent emphatically disagreed with
the majority's reasoning that Amendment Two fell outside of Ameri-
can constitutional tradition.5 7 Justice Scalia asserted that every law
has exactly the same effect as Amendment Two, at least to the extent
that laws at one level of government cannot be contradicted by laws at
a lower level.58 He summarized the Court's thesis as stating that "any
group is denied equal protection when, to obtain advantage (or, pre-
49. Id. at 1628-29.
50. Id. at 1629.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 1628 (quoting Department of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973)).
53. See id. at 1623 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia was joined in dissent by
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas.
54. Id. at 1629-31.
55. Id. at 1630.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 1630-31, 1634-36.
58. Id at 1630-31.
1997]
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sumably, to avoid disadvantage), it must have recourse to a more gen-
eral and hence more difficult level of political decisionmaking than
others."59 Scalia concluded that it would be "most unlikely that any
multilevel democracy can function under such a principle."60
Citing Davis v. Beason6' as a close, congressionally-approved pre-
cedent for upholding Amendment Two, Scalia reasoned that homosex-
uality falls within the confines of legislative authority.62 In Beason,
the Supreme Court upheld a statute of the Idaho Territory that denied
bigamists and polygamists the right to vote.6 3 Analogizing polygamy
to homosexuality, Scalia argued that Beason supported the proposi-
tion that homosexuality can be criminalized and that those engaging
in that crime can be denied the right to vote. 64 Scalia noted that the
Idaho Territory statute at issue in Beason, "which went much further
than Amendment [Two], denying polygamists not merely special
treatment but the right to vote," was not open to any constitutional or
legal objection.6 5 Using a greater-includes-the-lesser type of argu-
ment, this reading of Beason would directly support upholding
Amendment Two.
Finally, the dissent contended both that Colorado had a legitimate
state interest, independent of animus, in discouraging homosexuality
and that Amendment Two was rationally related to that interest.66
Justice Scalia accepted Colorado's justifications for enacting Amend-
ment Two and dismissed what the majority called animus as "moral
disapproval of homosexual conduct, the same sort of moral disap-
proval that produced the centuries-old criminal laws that we held con-
stitutional in Bowers."6 7
Justice Scalia was referring to Bowers v. Hardwick,68 a case in
which the United States Supreme Court upheld a Georgia law prohib-
iting homosexual sodomy. 69 In Bowers, the Court cited historical and
traditional moral disapproval of homosexual sodomy to establish a le-
gitimate state interest in its prohibition.70 The Romer dissent rea-
soned that if a legitimate state interest exists for prohibiting
homosexual conduct, then surely there exists an equally legitimate
59. Id. at 1630.
60. Id.
61. 133 U.S. 333 (1890).
62. Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1635-36 (1996)(Scalia, J., dissenting).
63. Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 346-47 (1890).
64. Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1636 (1996)(Scalia, J., dissenting).
65. Id. at 1636 n.3. Note the reference to "special treatment."
66. Id. at 1633.
67. Id.
68. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
69. Id. at 195.
70. Id.
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state interest in denying special rights to people who engage in such
conduct. 71
III. DISAGREEMENTS IN ROMER V. EVANS
The decision in Romer v. Evans was not an exercise in subtle dis-
tinctions. The majority and the dissent disagreed on almost every
point, displaying an ideological partisanship more commonly seen in
Congress. Essential to understanding the meaning of Romer is
whether these disagreements were founded upon differing views of ho-
mosexuality or instead would have been resolved similarly had
Amendment Two targeted another group.
If these disagreements turned solely on each Justice's personal un-
derstanding and acceptance of homosexuality, Romer has much more
weight as a harbinger of future decisions regarding gay rights. If, on
the other hand, the same conclusions would be reached regardless of
the group targeted in the amendment, then Romer's application is less
about gay rights than it is about efforts to trump antidiscrimination
laws. In examining the three major areas of disagreement between
the majority and the dissent, this Note concludes that the latter char-
acterization is more accurate, leaving the future of gay rights legisla-
tion uncertain.
A. Basic Protections or Special Rights
The majority and dissent first disagreed on the effect of the antidis-
crimination ordinances that Amendment Two repealed. The dissent
agreed with the State of Colorado that antidiscrimination laws grant
special rights to the class against whom discrimination is forbidden.
Therefore Amendment Two merely places homosexuals in the same
position as everyone else in society.72 The majority disagreed, how-
ever, reasoning that such laws are protective measures taken to pre-
vent unjust discrimination in public accommodations, housing, and
the workplace. 73
The "special rights" argument, as applied to the various Colorado
antidiscrimination ordinances affected by Amendment Two, implies
that only homosexuals benefit from laws banning discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation. This argument, however, is simply not
true. In plain language, these ordinances protect every citizen within
the reach of jurisdiction from discrimination based on their sexual ori-
entation.74 The protection is the same whether one is heterosexual,
homosexual, or somewhere in between. Indeed, a heterosexual denied
71. Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1631-32 (1996)(Scalia, J., dissenting).
72. Id. at 1629-30.
73. Id. at 1624-27.
74. See supra statutes cited note 2.
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employment, housing, or service based solely on his or her heterosexu-
ality would have a valid claim under these laws. 75
The dissent offered two examples of the special rights supposedly
conferred on homosexuals by antidiscrimination legislation.76 On
closer examination, however, neither example shows that homosexu-
als would obtain any benefit that similarly situated heterosexuals
would not.
In the first example, the "life-partner" of a homosexual would be
eligible for state death benefits when the longtime roommate of a het-
erosexual employee would not.7 7 The flaw in this analogy, however,
assumes that roommates and life partners are similarly situated. The
two parties in this example are not similarly situated unless the terms
"roommate" and "life-partner" are synonymous. Yet if one term is uti-
lized to describe both relationships in the example, then there is no
longer a difference in the result. Homosexual roommates, if that is
what they opt to be, are no more entitled to death benefits than the
heterosexual roommates. If, however, homosexual "life-partners" are
eligible to receive their partner's death benefits, it is because they are
in a relationship analogous to a heterosexual marriage. Heterosexual
"life-partners" possess, and often exercise, the option of marriage. 78
The difference in the two couples is that one has the option of mar-
rying to secure death benefits while the other does not. The dissent
would parlay this difference into a "special right" for homosexuals.
The dissent offered a second example, referring to an alleged re-
ceipt of special rights when insurance companies are required to ig-
nore sexual orientation when determining rates or insurability. 79 The
special right conferred on homosexuals, Justice Scalia argued, is that
"distinctive health insurance risks associated with homosexuality (if
there are any)" cannot be taken into account by health insurance prov-
iders.8 0 Yet, this ignores the distinctive health insurance risks associ-
ated with heterosexuality (if there are any) that must also be ignored
under Colorado law.8 1 As such, both homosexuals and heterosexuals
are treated equally in the insurance arena.
75. If this seems like an unlikely scenario, consider the current debate over affirma-
tive action. Laws that forbid discrimination on the basis of race and sex were
clearly enacted to protect racial minorities and women. Yet these same laws are
now being used to fight reverse discrimination against white males. See David
Michael McConnell, Comment, Title VII at Twenty-The Unsettled Dilemma of
"Reverse" Discrimination, 19 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1073 (1983).
76. Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1630 (1996).
77. Id.
78. Presumably, to be both "life-partners" and heterosexual, a couple would have to
be of the opposite sex.
79. Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1630 (1996)(Scalia, J., dissenting).
80. Id.
81. COLO REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-3-1104 (West 1997).
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Ultimately, antidiscrimination laws grant "special rights" to a
group only to the extent that individuals wish to discriminate against
that group. Such laws take a particular classification of people and
forbid unequal treatment based upon that classification. In doing so,
the laws grant "special rights" only in the eyes of those who believe
that unequal treatment is warranted. Those who believe equal treat-
ment is warranted do not see "special rights," but instead merely a
codification of their preexisting beliefs. For this reason, the Court
does not reject the "special rights" argument across the board. Rather,
the argument will be accepted or rejected in future cases based on the
Court's attitude concerning the classification at issue and whether
equal treatment within that classification is warranted.
B. Constitutional Tradition: Davis v. Beason
A second significant disagreement between the majority and the
dissent revolved around Amendment Two's function and whether it fit
within the American constitutional tradition. The majority held it did
not, stating that "[iut is at once too narrow and too broad. It identifies
persons by a single trait and then denies them protection across the
board."82 Similarly, the majority recognized the absence of precedent
for Amendment Two.S3
The dissent, on the other hand, viewed Amendment Two simply as
an effort by the majority of Colorado's citizens to preserve its view of
sexual morality against the efforts of a geographically concentrated
minority's efforts to undermine it.s4 Justice Scalia reasoned that the
treatment of polygamy under earlier constitutional practice was an al-
most indistinguishable precedent85 and criticized the majority for
"heavy reliance upon principles of righteousness rather than judicial
holdings."S6
In holding that Amendment Two fell outside of the American con-
stitutional tradition, the Court utilized a different analysis than that
employed by the Colorado Supreme Court.87 While not citing a single
82. Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1628 (1996).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1635 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
85. Id. at 1635-36.
86. Id. at 1629. Justice Scalia referred to "principles of righteousness" stated by the
majority throughout the majority opinion. See, e.g., id. at 1623 ("mhe Constitu-
tion 'neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens.- (quoting Plessy v. Fer-
guson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896)(Harlan, J., dissenting))); id. at 1628 ("Equal
protection of the laws is not achieved through indiscriminate imposition of ine-
qualities." (quoting Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22 (1948))); id. at 1629
("[Cilass legislation . . . [is] obnoxious to the prohibitions of the Fourteenth
Amendment...." (quoting Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 24 (1883))).
87. Id. at 1624. The Court's decision to decline to follow the Colorado Supreme
Court's holding seems based on a desire to grant neither heightened scrutiny to
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decision relied upon by the Colorado Supreme Court,8 8 the substance
of the majority's "constitutional tradition" objection rested on the
same considerations. For example, in Hunter v. Erickson,8 9 the Court
stated that the City of Akron was free to enact each and every piece of
municipal legislation by a majority vote, but in choosing to do other-
wise, the city could not disadvantage any particular group by making
it more difficult to enact legislation on such group's behalf.9o This is
the same objection that the Romer majority made to Amendment Two
under the guise of the constitutional tradition.9 1
One reason Amendment Two was open to attack on "general princi-
ples of righteousness" 92 was its lack of facial neutrality. Amendment
Two plainly stated that it was to affect only legislation protecting "ho-
mosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices, or rela-
tionships."93 Neutrality was not attempted. The amendment divided
the citizenry of Colorado into two classes: heterosexual and "other."
At the very least, this one-sided approach opened an avenue for any
objection based on the singling out of one particular group.
Amendment Two may have been facially neutral had it instead
based its restrictions on a neutral term, such as "sexual orientation."
Such wording would remove the majority's objection that Amendment
Two targeted a single named group, as every citizen of Colorado pos-
sesses some degree of sexual orientation.
The only precedent dealing with constitutional tradition that was
discussed in detail by either the majority or the dissent was Davis v.
Beason.9 4 The Romer dissent cited the holding of Beason as a "close,
congressionally approved precedent" for upholding Amendment Two.
In our judgement, § 501 of the Revised Statutes of Idaho Territory, which pro-
vides that 'no person ... who is a bigamist or polygamist or who teaches,
advises, counsels, or encourages any person or persons to become bigamists or
polygamists, or to commit any other crime defined by law, or to enter into
sexual orientation classifications nor to enumerate any new fundamental rights.
Yet, the Court distinguished between its "constitutional tradition" objection and
its "rational basis" analysis, which indicates that some type of scrutiny other
than "rational basis" is at work. In other words, the "constitutional tradition"
objection must either be heightened scrutiny of the rational basis test under a
new name or some new kind of equal protection analysis.
88. See supra cases cited notes 22-25.
89. 393 U.S. 385 (1969).
90. Id. at 392-93.
91. "M[The amendment has the peculiar property of imposing a broad and undifferen-
tiated disability on a single named group, an exceptional and... invalid form of
legislation." Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1627 (1996). "A law declaring that
in general it shall be more difficult for one group of citizens than for all others to
seek aid from the government is itself a denial of equal protection of the laws in
the most literal sense." Id. at 1628.
92. See supra note 86.
93. COLO. CoNsT. art. II, § 30b.
94. 133 U.S. 333 (1890).
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what is known as plural or celestial marriage, or who is a member of any
order, organization or association which teaches, advises, counsels, or encour-
ages its members or devotees or any other persons to commit the crime of
bigamy or polygamy, or any other crime defined by law.., is permitted to vote
at any election, or to hold any position or office of honor, trust, or profit within
this Territory,' is not open to any constitutional or legal objection.9 5
Comparing polygamy to homosexuality, Justice Scalia read this as a
direct precedent for upholding Amendment Two.96
There are, however, several problems with this approach. First, as
Justice Scalia readily admitted, much of the holding in Beason has
been overruled by subsequent cases.9 7 Stripped of the language made
irrelevant by these decisions, the above quote essentially authorizes
the government to deny polygamists and bigamists the right to vote.
Yet, it is unclear whether the moral aspect of polygamy or its ile-
gality can be used as a basis of disenfranchisement. 98 Polygamy was
a crime in the Idaho Territory when Beason was decided. As a result,
even if Beason allowed the government to deny the right to vote to
those practicing, but not convicted of, polygamy, the fact remains that
the practice of polygamy was a felony. Conversely, no aspect of homo-
sexuality enumerated in Amendment Two has been illegal in Colorado
since the time of its passage.9 9 Unless Beason allows disenfranchise-
ment solely on the noncriminal, moral aspects of polygamy, it retains
no precedential value as applied to Amendment Two.100
Second, the analogy between polygamy and homosexuality is im-
perfect. Granted, some similarities exist: both are matters related to
sexuality and the family, and both traditionally are subject to moral
disapproval. There is, however, a crucial difference. Polygamy is a
status entirely defined by conduct.101 Homosexuality is no more de-
fined solely by conduct than is heterosexuality. The difference be-
tween homosexuality and heterosexuality is merely the gender of the
parties involved.
95. Id. at 1635 (quoting Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 346-47 (1890)).
96. Id. at 1635-36.
97. Id. See Brandenberg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
98. Convicted felons can be denied the right to vote. See Richardson v. Ramirez, 418
U.S. 24 (1974). Homosexual sodomy can be criminalized. See Bowers v. Hard-
wick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
99. For example, no laws prohibiting homosexual orientation, conduct, practices, or
relationships have been passed in Colorado. COLO. CONsT. art. II, § 30b.
100. Although such a reading seems to implicate the line of voting rights cases decided
by the United States Supreme Court in the 1960s (see supra cases cited note 22),
Justice Scalia correctly points out that the fundamental right to vote alone trig-
gers strict scrutiny in these cases. Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1636 n.3
(1996)(Scalia, J., dissenting).
101. Black's Law Dictionary defines polygamy as "[tihe offense of having several wives
or husbands at the same time, or more than one wife or husband at the same
time." BLAcies LAw DICTIONARY 1159 (6th ed. 1990). Black's declines to attempt
a definition of homosexuality.
1997]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
C. The Animus Argument and Bowers v. Hardwick
A third major area of disagreement between the majority and the
dissent was whether Amendment Two was rationally related to a le-
gitimate state interest or instead was motivated solely by animus for
homosexuals.02 Three distinct issues surfaced in the opinions of both
the majority and the dissent: (1) which test to use; (2) whether the
test was met; and (3) the effect of animosity on Amendment Two's
validity.
Both the majority and the dissent used the "rational relation" test
in analyzing Amendment Two, but each did so for different reasons.
The dissent believed it was the appropriate test to adopt for its analy-
sis. i 0 3 Although the majority did not state which test it felt was ap-
propriate, it used the "rational relation" test as a sort of threshold test,
the failure of which would mean the failure of any higher level of scru-
tiny.i 0 4 This allowed the majority to avoid justifying an application of
heightened scrutiny, which would have required granting "suspect
class" status to homosexuals, finding Amendment Two violative of ex-
isting fundamental rights, or enumerating a new fundamental
right.105 The majority's implication that heightened scrutiny might
be justified is tantalizingly vague. No further explanation is found in
Romer, however.
Applying the rational basis test, the majority recognized that the
primary interests of the state in enacting Amendment Two included
respect for other citizens' freedom of association and the conservation
of resources to fight discrimination against other groups.O6 It held,
however, that the breadth of Amendment Two made it impossible to
credit those interests.' 0 7 The dissent, like the majority, also accepted
the state's freedom of association and conservation of resources argu-
ments, but instead focused its rational basis analysis on the "special
rights" argument.1 0 8
102. Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1628-29, 1633-34 (1996).
103. Id. at 1631.
104. "Amendment Two fails, indeed defies, even this conventional inquiry." Id. at 1627
(emphasis added). "[Even in the ordinary equal protection case calling for the
most deferential of standards, we insist on knowing the relation between the clas-
sification adopted and the object to be attained." Id. (emphasis added).
105. "[1]f a law neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, we
will uphold the legislative classification so long as it bears a rational relation to
some legitimate end." Id. See, e.g., Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319-21 (1993).
106. Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1629 (1996).
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1631-32. "I turn next to whether there was a legitimate rational basis for
the substance of the constitutional amendment-for the prohibition of special
protection for homosexuals.... [Tihe answer is ... obviously yes." Id. at 1631
(emphasis added).
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The majority found that animosity for homosexuals, rather than
the rationales advanced by the State, was the actual motive behind
Amendment Two. This finding contributed to the majority's conclu-
sion that Amendment Two failed to satisfy the rational relation analy-
sis, since "a bare .. . desire to harm a politically unpopular group
cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest."109 The dissent,
however, classified any animosity behind Amendment Two as the
same kind of animosity our society bears for any reprehensible
conduct.ll 0
Several points emanate from the Court's analysis. First, at least
as to homosexuality, the Court seemed unwilling to conclude that a
general "homosexuality is immoral argument" satisfies the rational
basis test, at least under equal protection analysis11 Second, with
respect to other groups whose discrimination protections might be
trumped, the Court found its objections to Amendment Two in the na-
ture of the law itself, rather than the targeted group.112
The dissent cited Bowers v. Hardwick"13 as precedent to determine
whether there existed a "legitimate state interest" in discouraging ho-
mosexuality.1 4 In Bowers, the Court upheld a Georgia law forbidding
homosexual sodomy against a Due Process challenge.115 In upholding
the statute, the Court cited a long history of moral disapproval of ho-
mosexual sodomy and thus declined to find an individual right to en-
gage in such behavior."16  Accordingly, the Court applied the
"legitimate state end, rationally related" test and, finding both, upheld
the law.117
The major distinction between Bowers and Romer is that the for-
mer is a due process case, while the latter involves an equal protection
analysis. Both of these analyses use the same basic test (legitimate
state interest, a statute that is rationally related to that interest), but
the protections they offer are quite different."18
The Due Process Clause commonly has been interpreted as back-
ward looking. Tradition and time-honored conventions are highly rel-
109. Id. at 1628 (quoting Department of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)).
110. Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1633 (1996).
111. This argument did essentially satisfy the Court under the Due Process Clause.
See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
112. "Laws of the kind now before us raise the inevitable inference that the disadvan-
tage imposed is born of animosity towards the class of persons affected." Romer
v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1628 (1996)(emphasis added).
113. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
114. Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1631-32 (1996).
115. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. See Cass R. Sunstein, Sexual Orientation and the Constitution: A Note on the
Relationship Between Due Process and Equal Protection, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 1161
(1988).
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evant under a due process analysis.11 9 The Equal Protection Clause,
in contrast, is forward looking in that it protects groups from discrimi-
natory state action despite a tradition to the contrary.' 20 Thus, Bow-
ers' holding that homosexual sodomy can be criminalized is irrelevant
to whether Amendment Two impermissibly targets homosexuals as a
class.121
IV. THE PRACTICAL IMPACT OF THE COURTS DECISION
Romer v. Evans had the potential to be a far-reaching decision af-
fecting gay rights. The opportunity was before the Court to emphati-
cally declare the level of scrutiny that applies to homosexuals under
an equal protection analysis. Instead, the Court narrowly focused on
the challenged amendment before it, finding it unconstitutional with-
out deciding on the class status of homosexuals.
To the extent Romer is a gay rights case, both sides of the issue can
claim some degree of victory. Traditional forces can breathe a sigh of
relief that the Court neither used Amendment Two as an opportunity
to overrule Bowers, nor granted suspect or quasi-suspect status to
homosexuals as a class. The Court focused mostly on the breadth of
Amendment Two, giving some indication that a narrower law, more
tightly focused on the interests that traditional forces wish to protect,
would pass constitutional muster.
On the other hand, gay rights supporters, particularly those in Col-
orado, can celebrate the demise of Amendment Two. Beyond that,
however, Romer should not be cause for much celebration. Those look-
ing for a judicial legitimization of homosexuality will be disappointed,
as the surface flaws of Amendment Two enabled the Court to avoid an
assessment of the underlying subject matter.
Perhaps the only hint the Court provided as insight for potential
future application of heightened scrutiny was its introduction to the
discussion of the constitutional tradition. "[Elven in the ordinary
equal protection case calling for the most deferential of standards, we
insist on knowing the relation between the classification adopted and
the object to be attained."122 This statement implies that Amendment
Two could implicate some higher level of scrutiny. In other words,
Romer is not "the ordinary equal protection case calling for the most
deferential of standards." 123 Because Amendment Two failed to meet
the lowest standard of review, the Court found it unnecessary to de-
119. Id. at 1163.
120. Id.
121. If Bowers was controlling precedent as to whether classifications based on homo-
sexuality met the rational basis test, then Romer could be seen as implicitly over-
ruling Bowers.
122. Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1627 (1996)(emphasis added).
123. Id.
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termine whether a higher standard should apply to homosexuals as a
class.
Romer ultimately will have a greater effect on discrimination laws
in general than on homosexuals as a class. Discrimination laws,
whatever their subject, take a certain characteristic and remove it
from the allowable decisionmaking process that employers, landlords,
or other groups use in conducting their affairs. The more a particular
group is in need of protection, the less popular that protection will be
with the majority. This unpopularity of laws protecting homosexuals
was the cornerstone in the enactment of Amendment Two, and no rea-
son suggests that groups other than homosexuals could not be simi-
larly targeted.
Amendment Two represented an attempt by a statewide majority
to invalidate all the protections gained by homosexuals at the various
levels of Colorado's governmental structure. Romer did not explicitly
invalidate such "trumping" laws, but it did set forth some guidelines.
First, such a law can not be overly broad. Amendment Two denied
relief from any discrimination against homosexuals, in any context, no
matter how damaging or invidious. To avoid the Romer Court's objec-
tion to breadth, any future legislation seeking to limit the protections
available to an identifiable group will have to be more closely targeted
to a legitimate state interest than was Amendment Two. For exam-
ple, a state could require an exception to laws banning sexual orienta-
tion discrimination in housing for those renting rooms in their own
home or seeking roommates. A similar exception might apply to busi-
nesses smaller than a certain size or religious institutions promoting
religious views that reject homosexuality.
Second, the Court seemed to object to Amendment Two's attempt
to single out one group from the population as a whole. In other
words, rather than eliminating the entire spectrum of sexual orienta-
tion from Colorado's discrimination law, Amendment Two only for-
bade protection for homosexuals. Even a facially neutral version of
Amendment Two could be viewed as founded upon animosity, espe-
cially if the clear purpose of the law was to disadvantage the minority
rather than to level the playing field. Nevertheless, a facially neutral
law would avoid the objection that it singles out a particular named
group.
Finally, on a broader level, Romer could be read as prohibiting
even facially neutral laws if, like Amendment Two, they remove a
classification from the possibility of antidiscrimination legislation
while allowing all others to seek protection at the local level. Under
this reading of Romer, a state could restrict passage of the state's dis-
crimination law to the legislative or constitutional level and forbid
smaller governmental subdivisions from enacting such legislation, but
could not remove certain classifications from local consideration.
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V. CONCLUSION
The Court's decision in Romer v. Evans represents a tactical, but
strategically hollow victory for gay rights. Bowers v. Hardwick stands
unchanged, and although Amendment Two was invalidated, the Court
declined to extend "suspect" or "quasi-suspect" class status to homo-
sexuals. Neither possibility was expressly eliminated, but neverthe-
less the opportunity was squarely before the Court and yet politely
declined. Proponents of future legislation, on either side of the issue,
now have a clearer understanding of the Court's reasoning on the is-
sue of homosexuality and can rely on that understanding when pro-
ducing appropriately tailored responses.
In hindsight, Romer v. Evans appears to be more of a denunciation
of Colorado's broad attempt to circumvent local discrimination ordi-
nances than a judicial sanction of homosexuality. The real benefac-
tors of this case may well be small or unpopular groups that can
muster the votes to pass local antidiscrimination ordinances where
they live. Gay rights supporters, on the other hand, must wait anx-
iously to see what the Court will say the next time it faces this contro-
versial issue.
Jonathan S. Bauer '98
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